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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Valarie Lynn Posey appeals from the magistrate court's order denying her
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a law enforcement officer's
warrantless entry into her house.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The facts underlying Posey's motion to suppress, based on the testimony
of Coeur d'Alene police officer Shane Avriett, were set forth by the magistrate
court as follows: 1
[Officer Avriett] was on duty on the 24th of March, 2011.
Approximately, 4:00 in the afternoon he responded to a call related
to an accident near 4th Street, south of Interstate 90 ....
He was coming from the north, so he was southbound. And
his testimony - and then that's corroborated by the video that was
taken in his patrol car, Defendant's A that was admitted into
evidence. You can see him approach the scene of the accident.
Now, you can't really see all of what he described verbally in his
testimony here because of the obstructions that were at the scene
there. But the Officer testified that there was a red car that had
been northbound that had damage on the front fender and in the
door area. There was, also, a gray SUV that had damage.
There was, you know, people around in the area. A young
girl, approximately of the age of 12 was near the island that had
some plantings and whatnot on it, that was bleeding.
The Officer put out some cones. He described the red car
further as having additional damage, in that the airbags had been
deployed. The front left wheel had been broken and was at a kind of a strange angle. And the driver of this red car was not
present at the scene.

During oral argument in her appeal to the district court, Posey said she did not
take issue with any of the magistrate court's factual findings (Tr., 2/29/12, p.12,
Ls.6-8), and appears to maintain that position on appeal (Appellant's Brief, p.2).
1

1

Now, Officer Morgan and some other witnesses that were at
the scene indicated that the driver had left the scene, westbound,
apparently on foot.
Officer Avriett was in additional communication with
Dispatch. They relayed some additional information to him about
the driver, indicated it was a female.
There was a reporting party. Now, we didn't get the name of
that individual here on the record, but the impression that I got is
that, you know, law enforcement did get the name of that individual
and other identifying information. And we could see the individual
on the -- at one point on the video.
But that this reporting party had apparently followed the
driver of the vehicle from the location of the accident to another
location over near Government way and relayed that information to
lawenforcement. That was then relayed to officer Avriett. So, he
then left the accident scene to go over the few blocks over to
Government Way to see if he could contact the driver of the
vehicle. As he got to the area in question on Government Way, this
reporting party flagged him down. You could kind of see it on the
video. And indicated that the woman had gone into the house.
And there was -- you know, he pointed out the house.
And the officer went to the door. Knocked on the door
several times. There's no answer. Contacted Dispatch to see if
they had a phone number for that particular address. And I think
the description was 2202 Government Way. The officer heard no
movements, no voices inside.
He wanted to contact a supervisor to see if it would be
appropriate or to get approval to break the door down.
Now, right around in this area some additional conversation
is taking place between the officer and the reporting party. This
reporting party, you can hear him indicate there that the woman
appeared to be "out of it". She was bleeding from the face. She
went into the house. The reporting party, also, indicated that when
he was still at the scene of the accident that the woman had tried
to, you know, get the car going again. The individual stopped the
individual from going and took the keys away, and then had
followed her over to this residential location where she went into the
house.
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All right. The supervisor is contacted, approves of the officer
breaching the door. The officer had tried to kick the door open, was
unable to do that. The Fire Department arrived with a large sledge
hammer. And the officer used that, got in the door by breaking it
down. Further warnings were given prior to that occurring and the
door still didn't open.
When he did go in through the front door, saw an elderly
gentleman there. Asked where the female was. At some point it
was pointed out that this female was behind another -- either this
door or some other door. She was holding a cloth to her face.
Officer Avriett identified this individual as being the
defendant in this case here in open court. She was instructed to go
outside. She appeared dazed and confused. She declined medical
attention, but her nose was cut, possibly broken. She had cuts on
her face, a black eye.
(Mot. Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.45, L.5. 2 )
Officer Avriett noticed that Posey had a strong odor of alcohol on her
breath, and after she first told him she had had a few beers, she said she had
four beers at a bar. (R., p.15.) Officer Avriett placed Posey under arrest after
she failed to satisfactorily perform field sobriety tests. (Id.) Posey was taken to
Kootenai Medical Center to be evaluated because she had previously refused
medical treatment, and provided a blood sample which showed her blood alcohol
content was .34. (R., pp.16-17, 39-40.) Posey was charged in an amended
criminal complaint with (1) excessive DUI (.20 or higher BAC), (2) failure to
purchase/invalid license, (3) transporting an open alcohol container, and (4)
leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle. (R., pp.39-40.)
Posey filed a motion to suppress based upon the federal and state
constitutions, claiming that Officer Avriett's entry into her house was not justified

The May 27, 2011 hearing on Posey's motion to suppress will be referred to as
"Mot. Tr."

2

3

by any exception to the warrant requirement. (R, pp.41-41.) After a hearing on
Posey's motion, the magistrate judge issued a verbal ruling denying Posey's
suppression motion, followed by a written order, finding the officer's entry into
Posey's house was justified as an appropriate use of the community caretaking
function to check on Posey's condition. (See generally Mot. Tr.; R, pp.54-55.)
Posey appealed the magistrate's decision to the district court. (R, pp.7375.)

After briefing and oral argument (R, pp.107-149; see generally Tr.,

2/29/12), the district court affirmed the magistrate court's order denying Posey's
motion to suppress based upon the community caretaking exception to the
warrant requirement (R, pp.175-183).

Posey filed a timely appeal from the

district court's appellate order. (R., pp.188-191.)

4

ISSUES
Posey states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Is there an applicable exception to the warrant requirement
that justified the police officer's entry into Posey's home?
2.
If the entry into Posey's home was unlawful, should the
evidence obtained thereby be excluded?
(Appellant's Brief, p.g.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Posey failed to show error in the magistrate court's denial of her motion to
suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
Posey Has Failed To Show Error In The Magistrate Court's Denial Of Her Motion
To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Posey asserts the magistrate court erred in denying her motion to

suppress, contending: (1) the "community caretaking function is not applicable to
an officer's entry into a person's home" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), (2) the
community caretaking doctrine is inapplicable because Officer Avriett's entrance
into Posey's house was not "totally divorced" from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute (citing Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973» (id., pp.11-16, 18-20), (3) even if the
community caretaking doctrine is applicable, the officer's entrance into Posey's
home was unreasonable (id., pp.18-19), and (4) because the officer's entry into
Posey's home was unlawful, the evidence obtained should be excluded under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the even broader
protections of Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution (id., pp.20-26).
Posey's arguments fail.

Application of the law to the facts shows the

magistrate court correctly concluded that Officer Avriett's actions in this case
were constitutionally reasonable for purposes of both the federal and state
constitutions.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from the decision of a district court sitting in its intermediate

appellate

capacity,

the

appellate

court
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reviews

the

magistrate's ruling

independently, giving due consideration, but not deference, to the district court's
appellate determination.

State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 13, 15, 56 P.3d 775, 777

(2002); State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818, 10 P.3d 1285, 1287 (2000),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 88 P.3d 704 (2004).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by sUbstantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

C.

Posey Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of Her
Suppression Motion
Posey asserts "Officer Avriett's conduct of breaking open [her] front door

with a sledge hammer to gain entry was not reasonable."
p.19.)

(Appellant's Brief,

The magistrate court denied her suppression motion, finding that the

totality of the circumstances, and especially the information provided by the
reporting party who followed Posey as she walked to her house after the accident
- i.e., Posey was completely "out of it" and was bleeding from the face- justified
the officer's entry into Posey's home as a community caretaking function: 3 (Mot.
Tr., p.45, Ls.7-11; p.47, Ls.19-24; see id., p.8, Ls.8-15.) The court explained:
Under the circumstances here, I'm constrained to find that
this is an appropriate use of the community caretaking function.

3 In addition to asserting the community caretaking function exception to the
warrant requirement, the prosecutor argued that the "exigent circumstances"
exception justified the officer's entry into Posey's home. (Mot. Tr., p.32, Ls1725.) That basis for denying Posey's suppression motion was rejected by the
magistrate court. (Mot. Tr., p.45, Ls.15-19.)
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That he did have evidence indicating that the person was injured,
was "out of it", bleeding. The Officer didn't know the extent of the
injuries. If this young lady had gone into the house and expired, the
Officer would have been liable for not doing something about that.
So, I feel that the community caretaking function, under the
totality of the circumstances with everything that the Officer had
available to him at that time, was appropriate here. That the search
at that point to see what her condition was, and to talk to her, and
see if she needed any further help was appropriate.
(Mot. Tr., p.48, Ls.12-23.)
"[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone

of the

Fourth Amendment is

'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions."
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citations omitted). Thus, for
example, a warrant is not required where "the exigencies of the situation make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
quotations omitted).

kL.

(citations and

'The reasonableness standard imposed by the Fourth

Amendment requires that the nature of the intrusion upon the individual's privacy
interest be balanced against the public need and governmental interest promoted
by the action taken." State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217
(2003) (citations omitted). Reasonableness is assessed based on the totality of
the circumstances.

kL.

Courts have repeatedly recognized that members of law

enforcement do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they take action
consistent with their community caretaking function.

kL.

The community caretaking function involves the duty of the police to help
individuals that officers believe are in need of immediate assistance. State v.
Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citing In re Clayton,

8

113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401 (1988».

"In analyzing community caretaking

function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the circumstances test."

.!sL.

"The constitutional standard in community caretaking function cases is

whether intrusive action of police was reasonable in view of all surrounding
circumstances." Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002 (quoting State v.
Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 867, 893 P.2d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1995» (brackets
omitted).
Posey asserts the community caretaking exception to the warrant
requirement does not apply to an officer's entry into a home - vis-a-vis a vehicle.
(Appellant's

Brief, pp.16-17.)

However, the emergency aid doctrine is

encompassed within the community caretaking function, and has been applied to
cases involving warrantless entries into homes. Barrett, 138 Idaho at 292, 295,
62 P.3d at 216, 219 (explaining that Idaho "treats the emergency aid doctrine
within the community care-taking function exception"); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho
432, 925 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1996) (need to prevent risk of violence to
defendant's girlfriend and child justified warrantless entry into defendant's
residence as "exigent circumstances"); see Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398
(2006).4 Posey's assertion that Officer Avriett's entry into her home cannot be

4 In Brigham City, officers entered a home after seeing a "melee" inside that
involved "four adults [who] were attempting, with some difficulty to restrain a
juvenile." 547 U.S. at 401. "The juvenile eventually broke free, swung a fist and
struck one of the adults in the face," drawing blood. .!sL. (quotations omitted).
"The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him against a
refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor."
.!sL. It was only then that an officer "opened the screen door and announced the
officers' presence." .!sL. The Court concluded the officers behaved reasonably
under the emergency aid doctrine in entering the residence, noting that the

9

justified as a community caretaking function, which includes the emergency aid
doctrine, is not accurate.
Posey also relies upon a comment by the Supreme Court in Cady, 413
U.S. at 441, that police officers "frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term,
may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13 (emphasis by Appellant.)

Although

Posey appears to argue that Cady's comment means that a police officer's
subjective motives or expectations while engaged in a community caretaking
function must be totally divorced from any hope or expectation of detecting or
investigating criminality (see id., pp.13-15), it is the community caretaking
function itself that the Court alluded to as being totally divorced from a criminal

investigation or detection - not an officer's subjective motives or intent. Contrary
to Posey's argument (see id., pp.14-15), the "additional language" in several
Idaho cases which explains that an "officer may harbor at least an expectation of
detecting or finding evidence of a crime" when engaged in a community

officer "opened the screen door and yelled in police" and only entered to
announce the officers' presence "[w]hen nobody heard him." Brigham City, 547
U.S. at 406. The Court reasoned that the officer's conduct "was probably the
only option that had even a chance of rising above the din," and was
constitutionally reasonable under the circumstances. kt at 406-07. The Court
further noted "it would serve no purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the
door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their
presence."
10

caretaking function, is appropriate and is not at odds with the Cady decision.5
See State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442,445,34 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2001);
State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301,304,47 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002).
The emergency aid doctrine allows law enforcement to make a
warrantless entry into a place protected by the Fourth Amendment when there is
a "need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such
injury."

Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (citations omitted).

"An action is

5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the relationship between the
community caretaking and exigent circumstances doctrines in Hunsberger v.
Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4 th Cir. 2009), and adopted the objective standard of
the latter doctrine, explaining:
The parties suggest that Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398 ... (2006), might collapse the distinction between the two
doctrines. In upholding a warrantless home entry pursuant to a
claimed exigency, the Court in Stuart made clear that in general "an
action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances,
viewed objectively,'" support the action. Id. at 404, ... (quoting
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 ... (1978)). "The officer's
subjective motivation is irrelevant." Id. See also Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 ... (1996). This holding initially seems
in some tension with Dombrowski, which requires a court to
determine whether a police officer was engaged in a function
"totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." 413 U.S. at
441 . . .. However, the Court in Stuart also made clear that '''an
inquiry into programmatic purpose' is sometimes appropriate." 547
U.S. at 405 ... (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,46 ..
. (2000)). We think the best reading of the relationship between the
two exceptions is that when analyzing a search made as the result
of a routine police procedure, such as the policy of locating
weapons in towed cars in Dombrowski, the court should examine
the programmatic purpose of the policy - whether it was animated
by community care-taking considerations or by law enforcement
concerns. But when the search in question was performed by a law
enforcement officer responding to an emergency, and not as part of
a standardized procedure, the exigent circumstances analysis and
its accompanying objective standard should apply.
11

'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's
state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the
action."

~

at 404 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)
"The officer's subjective motive is

(emphasis original, brackets omitted).

irrelevant." Brigham City at 404 (citation omitted).
This case is factually analogous to Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 62 P.3d 214.
In Barrett, law enforcement responded to a report of a man who was collapsed
on his front porch and unresponsive.

~

at 292, 62 P.3d at 216. A neighbor

advised the officer that Barrett lived with his wife and two children but that he had
not seen them that day.

kL.

Because Barrett did not respond to questions about

whether there was anyone else in the house, the officers on scene "proceeded to
Barrett's house and identified themselves loudly several times, asking any
persons inside to come to the front door."

kL.

"[G]etting no response and hearing

nothing from inside," and concerned that Barrett's wife and children could be
inside and in need of medical assistance, the officers entered the residence.

~

Once inside, the officers did not find any other occupants, but they did find
paraphernalia and heroin in plain view.

kL.

On appeal, Barrett challenged the denial of his suppression motion.
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 293, 62 P.3d at 217.

The Court of Appeals upheld the

district court's order denying Barrett's motion, concluding:
Under the totality of the facts and circumstances as known to
the police at the time that they entered Barrett's house, and
reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, we conclude that there
existed a compelling need for the police to enter. The state has
satisfied its burden to show that the risk of danger to persons inside
the dwelling, as then reasonably perceived by police, constituted an
12

exigency justifying that warrantless entry. Here, the state's claim of
exigency is not a mere pretext for an unlawful entry and search, but
the police officers legitimately believed, particularly in view of their
inability to discern the cause of the medical condition affecting
Barrett, that the life of any occupants of Barrett's house may very
well have been at stake. Because the' police officers were still in
the process of searching downstairs for persons in need of
assistance, the exigent circumstances had not ceased to exist
when [an officer] observed the drug evidence in plain view in the
kitchen.
Barrett, 138 Idaho at 294-95,62 P.3d at 218-19; see State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho
432, 925 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1996) (need to prevent risk of violence to
defendant's girlfriend and child justified warrantless entry into defendant's
residence as "exigent circumstances").
As in Barrett, and regardless of whether designated "emergency aid" or
"community caretaking," there was a "compelling need for the police to enter"
Posey's home. The magistrate summarized the facts showing it was reasonable
for Officer Avriett to enter Posey's home in order to find out if she needed
medical attention:
... [C]learly there's an accident involved. Clearly people are
injured. We have the 12 year old that's injured there at the scene.
We've got airbags deployed. Severe damage to the red car.
The driver of the vehicle is gone. A reporting following [sic]
them over to another location, after the person tried to get the car
doing [sic] again, even though the car is clearly not drivable at that
point. Has to take the keys away from the person. Describes the
person to the Officer as being "out of if', bleeding from the face.
So, you know, the Officer, I think, reasonably, under these
circumstances, has a belief that the individual is need [sic] of
immediate assistance. Okay.
(Mot. Tr., pA7, L.16 - p. 48, L.2.) Based on the totality of the circumstances,
especially the reporting party's statement that the driver of the red car that was
13

involved in the accident looked "out of it," was bleeding from her face, and had
walked away from the accident scene and into a house, the magistrate court
correctly found that Officer Avriett had a legitimate basis for concern that Posey
could have been in need of medical assistance.
Posey next argues that "breaking open [her] front door with a sledge
hammer to gain entry was not reasonable" (Appellant's Brief, p.19), apparently
contending that the use of a sledge hammer to open the door was unreasonable.
The magistrate found Officer Avriett's use of a sledge hammer to open the door
reasonable under the circumstances, concluding:
Now, does that warrant using a sledge hammer to get in the
front door? That's - I'm struggling a little bit with that part of it
there. That is way at the end of what might be considered
reasonable in going into somebody's house.
The Officer did knock several times. Called out. Indicated
police were there. Got the permission and all of that. I think he did
everything he could.
(Mot. Tr., pA8, Ls.3-11.) The suppression testimony of Officer Avriett supports
the magistrate's finding. Officer Avriett testified that he knocked on the door a
few times and received no answer, and then he contacted his supervisor and
received permission to enter the house. (Mot. Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.19.) Next,
the officer loudly announced "Coeur d'Alene Police, open the door," and tried
unsuccessfully to kick the door open five or six times.

(Mot. Tr., p.10, L.25 -

p.11, L.21.) At that point, Fire Department personnel provided the officer with a
sledge hammer, and he commanded two or three times, "Step away from the
door," and then struck the door with the sledge hammer, opening it. (Mot. Tr.,
p.12, L.2 - p.13, L.21.) Under the circumstances, and considering that Officer

14

Avriett shouted out warnings and tried to breach the door by first kicking it,
resorting to using a sledge hammer to open the door was reasonable.
Posey has failed to demonstrate that law enforcement acted unreasonably
in violation of the Fourth Amendment by entering her home to ensure the safety
of whoever had been injured in the vehicle accident.

Because the officer was

lawfully in the process of ascertaining Posey's well-being when he noticed the
odor of alcohol on her breath, which led to other evidence that she was under the
influence of alcohol, there was no Fourth Amendment violation requiring
suppression of any evidence. Posey has therefore failed to demonstrate error in
the magistrate court's denial of her motion to suppress.
Lastly, Posey asserts that, even if Officer Avriett's entry into her home was
constitutional under the federal constitution, it was nonetheless unconstitutional
under the broader protections of Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-25.) However, apart from pointing out that Article 1, §
17 may be interpreted more broadly than the Fourth Amendment, Posey
presents no "cogent reason why our state constitution should be applied
differently" than the federal constitution. State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130,
982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999). Posey does not cite any textual or structural
differences between the federal and state constitution, list any matters of
particular state interest or local concern, public attitudes, or state traditions that
might support an argument for interpreting the Idaho law on warrantless home
entries based

on exigent circumstances, emergency aid, or community

caretaking, any differently than the federal constitutional provision. See State v.

15

Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992) (Bistline, J.,
concurring). Therefore, this Court should view the state constitution coextensive
with the federal constitution for the purpose of considering whether Officer
Avriett's warrantless entry into Posey's home was unconstitutional, and conclude
it was not.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the magistrate court's
order denying Posey's motion to suppress.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2012.
/'

~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of November, 2012, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
J. LYNN BROOKS
Deputy Public Defender
400 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

McKinney
Attorney General

JCM/pm
16

